1 Haleigh Bartos and John Chin, “Biden’s Africa Policy Trilemma,” The Duck of Minerva (blog), October 12, 2023, https://www.duckofminerva.com/2023/10/bidens-africa-policy-trilemma.html.
2 Michelle Nichols, “‘An Epidemic’ of Coups, U.N. Chief Laments, Urging Security Council to Act,” Reuters, October 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/an-epidemic-coups-un-chief-laments-urging-security-council-act-2021-10-26/.
3 See the discourse following Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989).
4 During the Cold War, Africa vied with the Middle East as the least democratic region in the world, according to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) electoral democracy index. The mean electoral democracy score in Africa doubled from .2 in 1989 to over .43 by 2018 (on a 0–1 scale). For more on global democracy trends using V-Dem data, see Carl Henrik Knutsen and Svend-Erik Skaaning, “The Ups and Downs of Democracy, 1789–2018,” in Why Democracies Develop and Decline, ed. Michael Coppedge et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 29–54. Most African states became “electoral autocracies” initially, not democracies. Even where authoritarian regimes survived on the continent, many were forced to make liberalizing concessions, such as shaking up cabinets to incorporate opposition party members. See Josef Woldense and Alex Kroeger, “Elite Change without Regime Change: Authoritarian Persistence in Africa and the End of the Cold War,” American Political Science Review, 2023, 1–17.
5 For more background on the ERT definitions and data on episodes of democratization and autocratization, see Seraphine F. Maerz et al., “Episodes of Regime Transformation,” Journal of Peace Research (July 2023): 1–18.
6 For more background on the RoW definitions and data on regime types, see Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg, and Staffan I. Lindberg, “Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes,” Politics and Governance 6, no. 1 (2018): 60–77.
7 Part of the explanation for accelerated backsliding since 2020 is that the COVID-19 pandemic gave some African regimes cover to increase repression and target political opposition. Donald Grasse et al., “Opportunistic Repression: Civilian Targeting by the State in Response to COVID-19,” International Security 46, no. 2 (2021): 130–65.
8 By contrast, Freedom House rates 17 percent of African countries as “free.” Why? With a few exceptions such as South Africa and Ghana, many of the most democratic states in the region are microstates such as Cape Verde, Seychelles, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Yana Gorokhovskaia and Cathryn Grothe, “Freedom in the World 2024: Regional Trends and Threats to Freedom,” Freedom House, February 29, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2024/mounting-damage-flawed-elections-and-armed-conflict/regional-trends.
9 Michael Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Country-Year Dataset V14” (Varieties of Democracy [V-Dem] Project, 2024), https://doi.org/10.23696/mcwt-fr58.
10 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Why the Military Abandoned Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 33, no. 1 (2022): 27–39.
11 Louis Amédée Darga and Suhaylah Peeraullee, “Can Mauritians Save a Democracy in Trouble?” Washington Post, July 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/25/can-mauritians-save-democracy-trouble/; Adam Valavanis, “Authoritarianism in Comoros Is Resurgent,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), October 31, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/authoritarianism-comoros-resurgent.
12 For Tinubu’s remarks, see Nellie Peyton et al., “Reactions to Gabon Military Coup,” Reuters, August 31, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/reactions-gabon-army-officers-announcing-coup-2023-08-30/. On the narrative of the decline and comeback of African coups, see John Frank Clark, “The Decline of the African Military Coup,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007): 141–55; Dave Lawler, “Coups Are Becoming a Thing of the Past,” Axios, January 31, 2019, https://www.axios.com/coups-are-becoming-a-thing-of-the-past-df39d484-cfc2-4eb3-b85f-94e3d15d238c.html; Dave Lawler, “Coups Are Making a Comeback,” Axios, January 30, 2022, https://www.axios.com/coup-attemps-countries-around-world-e14f76d2-16b1-43da-8411-6f8fc07cec84.html.
13 Colpus classifies the military takeover in Myanmar in February 2022 as a self-coup. For more on the conceptualization and measurement of coups (and the distinction with self-coups), see John J. Chin, David B. Carter, and Joseph G. Wright, “The Varieties of Coups D’état: Introducing the Colpus Dataset,” International Studies Quarterly 65, no. 4 (2021): 1040–51. For updated Colpus data, see https://www.johnjchin.com/colpus/. For narratives of these coups and discussion of coup causes, see John J. Chin, “Coups d’Etat in the Covid-19 Era,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 28 (2021): 161; John J. Chin and Jessica Kirkpatrick, “African Coups D’etat in the Covid-19 Era: A Current History,” Frontiers in Political Science 5 (2023): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1077945.
14 “Country Hub: Sudan,” ACLED, accessed October 17, 2023, https://acleddata.com/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/.
15 “Why Africans Are Losing Faith in Democracy,” The Economist, October 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/10/05/why-africans-are-losing-faith-in-democracy.
16 E. Gyimah-Boadi, Carolyn Logan, and Josephine Sanny, “Africans’ Durable Demand for Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (2021): 136–51.
17 “PP85: Africans Want More Democracy, but Their Leaders Still Aren’t Listening,” Afrobarometer, January 19, 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp85-africans-want-more-democracy-but-their-leaders-still-arent-listening/.
18 Josephine Sanny, “Afrobarometer Data Show Worrying Trends for Democracy in Africa, Prof. Gyimah-Boadi Warns,” Afrobarometer (blog), June 16, 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/afrobarometer-data-show-worrying-trends-for-democracy-in-africa-prof-gyimah-boadi-warns/.
19 Daniel Tuki, “What Does the Population in Niger Think about a Military Government?” Democratization, 2024, 1–26.
20 “Democracy in Crisis: Africa’s Long-Standing Democracies under Pressure, Afrobarometer CEO Warns,” Afrobarometer, April 13, 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/democracy-in-crisis-africas-long-standing-democracies-under-pressure-afrobarometer-ceo-warns/.
21 Hervé Akinocho, “AD761: As Africans Enter Busy Political Year, Scepticism Marks Weakening Support for Elections,” Afrobarometer Dispatch (blog), February 1, 2024, https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad761-as-africans-enter-busy-political-year-scepticism-marks-weakening-support-for-elections/.
22 Elections recently took place in Togo, Senegal, and Comoros. Between May 2024 and December 2024, elections are scheduled in nine sub-Saharan African countries (South Africa, Madagascar, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Mozambique, Namibia, Ghana, South Sudan) and two North African countries (Mauritania, Algeria). “Global Elections Calendar,” National Democratic Institute, accessed May 8, 2024, https://www.ndi.org/elections-calendar.
23 News Wires, “Mali Junta Delays February Presidential Election for ‘Technical Reasons,’” France 24, September 25, 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230925-mali-junta-delays-february-presidential-election-for-technical-reasons.
24 Sofia Christensen, “Burkina Faso Junta Leader Says No Elections until the Country Safe for Voting,” Reuters, September 29, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-junta-leader-says-no-elections-until-country-safe-voting-2023-09-29/.
25 Fadima Kontao, “Mali Political Parties Request Elections after Junta Shuns Transition Promise,” Reuters, April 1, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-political-parties-request-elections-after-junta-shuns-transition-promise-2024-04-01/.
26 Mahamat Ramadane, “Chad to Hold Presidential Election in May-June,” Reuters, February 27, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chad-hold-presidential-election-may-june-2024-02-27/.
27 Africa accounted for 18 of 41 internal armed conflicts in 2022 that caused at least 1,000 battle deaths, per the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 23.1, at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#armedconflict.
28 This index lists Nigeria and Sudan in the top ten with “Extreme” conflict. “High” conflict levels are reported in eight African states (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Somalia). “ACLED Conflict Index,” ACLED, January 2024, https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/.
29 “Conflict Watchlist 2024,” ACLED (blog), accessed April 3, 2024, https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/.
30 Some regional armed conflict trends can be visualized at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/. For more on “Africa’s World War” in the 1990s and 2000s, see Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
31 The other African civil war involves the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Gambella Liberation Front in Ethiopia. Summaries on the history of each of these conflicts to 2022 can be found by searching https://ucdp.uu.se/.
32 Monica Duffy Toft, “Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, no. 9 (2021): 1607–34.
33 Among civil wars on the continent in 2022, only the insurgency by the Islamic State in Nigeria saw fatalities drop in 2022. This conflict de-escalation was a unique situation driven in part by the weakening of Boko Haram after the death of their leader Abubakr Shekau in May 2021, which in turn meant fewer clashes with the Islamic State’s West Africa Province for territorial control. Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg, “Organized Violence 1989–2022, and the Return of Conflict between States,” Journal of Peace Research 60, no. 4 (2023): 693–94.
34 Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg, “Organized Violence 1989–2022,” 694, 703–4.
35 Clionadh Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–60. Updated ACLED data is available at https://acleddata.com/curated-data-files/.
36 Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2024,” Vision of Humanity, 2024, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/.
37 Chin and Kirkpatrick, “African Coups D’etat in the Covid-19 Era: A Current History.”
38 “Conflict Watchlist 2024 | The Sahel: A Deadly New Era in the Decades-Long Conflict,” ACLED (blog), January 17, 2024, https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sahel/.
39 Héni Nsaibia, “Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel,” ACLED (blog), September 21, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/09/21/fact-sheet-attacks-on-civilians-spike-in-mali-as-security-deteriorates-across-the-sahel/.
40 Sharan Grewal, “Why Sudan Succeeded Where Algeria Failed,” Journal of Democracy 32, no. 4 (2021): 102–14.
41 Andrea Carboni, “Conflict Watchlist 2024 | Sudan: Setting the Stage for a Long War,” ACLED (blog), January 17, 2024, https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sudan/.
42 Kyle Rempfer, “New in 2019: Two New U.S. Air Bases in Africa Nearing Completion,” Air Force Times, January 4, 2019, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/01/03/new-in-2019-two-new-us-airbases-in-africa-nearing-completion/; Stephen Losey, “This Obscure, Costly Air Base Is the New Front in the Battle against Violent Extremism,” Air Force Times, November 14, 2019, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/11/14/this-obscure-costly-air-base-is-the-new-front-in-the-battle-against-violent-extremism/.
43 Joshua Hammer, “What Is Wagner Doing in Africa?” The Atlantic (blog), May 3, 2024, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/05/wagner-africa-russia-mercenary/678258/.
44 Baba Ahmed, “U.N. Peacekeepers in Mali Withdraw from Two Bases in the North as Fighting Intensifies,” AP News, October 17, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/mali-united-nations-peacekeepers-kidal-insecurity-tuareg-b9cb52aa5baa87f83d2f76822f7df731.
45 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Military to Withdraw Troops From Niger,” New York Times, April 19, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/19/us/politics/us-niger-military-withdrawal.html.
46 Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “Russian Troops Enter Base Housing U.S. Military in Niger, U.S. Official Says,” Reuters, May 3, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-enter-base-housing-us-military-niger-us-official-says-2024-05-02/.
47 Natasha Bertrand, “U.S. Withdraws Troops from Base in Chad Following Government Demand,” CNN, May 1, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/01/politics/us-withdraws-troops-chad/index.html.
48 Liam Karr, “Africa File Special Edition: Niger Cuts the United States for Russia and Iran,” Critical Threats (blog), March 21, 2024, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-niger-cuts-the-united-states-for-russia-and-iran.
49 Marta Kepe et al., Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Africa (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2023); Joe Bruhl, “America Ignores Africa at Its Own Peril,” War on the Rocks, June 14, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/america-ignores-africa-at-its-own-peril/.
50 Great power competition is a rising theme in recent U.S. national security strategies. John J. Chin, Kiron Skinner, and Clay Yoo, “Understanding National Security Strategies Through Time,” Texas National Security Review 6, no. 4 (2023): 103–24.
51 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). After the Cold War, Western democracies could more credibly condition foreign aid to African countries on democratic reform. Thad Dunning, “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 409–23.
52 On autocratic patrons as “black knights,” see Mark Chou, “Have the Black Knights Arisen? China’s and Russia’s Support of Autocratic Regimes,” Democratization 24, no. 1 (2017): 175–84. On China and Russia’s interest in autocracy promotion more broadly, see, e.g., “Authoritarian Internationalism,” in John M. Owen IV, The Ecology of Nations: American Democracy in a Fragile World Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023), 201–27; Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “China’s Threat to Global Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 34, no. 1 (2023): 65–79.
53 Dawn C. Murphy, China’s Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing’s Alternative World Order (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022); Aaron Friedberg, “A World of Blocs?” War on the Rocks, July 25, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/a-world-of-blocs/. Dawn C. Murphy, China’s Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing’s Alternative World Order (Stanford University Press, 2022).We focus on Russia and China, though smaller non-democratic powers such as Iran, Venezuela, and the United Arab Emirates also seek to increase their influence in Africa. See Michaela Millender, “IntelBrief: Iran Extends Its Influence in Africa,” The Soufan Center (blog), April 1, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-april-1/; Scott B. MacDonald, “Venezuela’s Africa Gambit,” The National Interest, February 8, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/venezuela%E2%80%99s-africa-gambit-209207; “Gulf Countries Are Becoming Major Players in Africa,” The Economist, March 13, 2024, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/03/13/gulf-countries-are-becoming-major-players-in-africa.
54 Remarks at Carnegie Mellon University, September 28, 2023.
55 See the Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) index, which aggregates measures of “bandwidth” and “dependence” related to bilateral trade, aid, arms transfers, military alliances, level of diplomatic representation, and international organization memberships. Jonathan D. Moyer et al., “Power and Influence in a Globalized World,” Atlantic Council, February 20, 2018, 1, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/power-and-influence-in-a-globalized-world/; Jonathan D. Moyer et al., “China-U.S. Competition: Measuring Global Influence,” Atlantic Council and Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies, 2021. Data available at https://korbel.du.edu/fbic. Report available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/China-US-Competition-Report-2021.pdf.
56 The trade and investment data come from the International Monetary Fund, namely the Direction of Trade Statistics database and the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey. Available at https://www.imf.org/en/Data.
57 Some recent literature refers to these anti-democratic policies as “sharp power,” distinct from more benign “soft power.” Glenn Tiffert and Oliver McPherson-Smith, “China’s Sharp Power in Africa: A Handbook for Building National Resilience,” Hoover Institution, March 2022, https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-sharp-power-africa-handbook-building-national-resilience; Melissa Aten and John K. Glenn, “After Wagner: Russia’s Export of Kleptocracy to Africa,” Power 3.0: Understanding Modern Authoritarian Influence (blog), September 5, 2023, https://www.power3point0.org/2023/09/05/after-wagner-russias-export-of-kleptocracy-to-africa/.
58 Tiemoko Diallo and Bate Felix, “Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso Sign Sahel Security Pact,” Reuters, September 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16/.
59 Elian Peltier and Ruth Maclean, “French Soldiers Quit Mali After 9 Years, Billions Spent and Many Lives Lost,” New York Times, August 15, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/15/world/africa/mali-france-military-operation.html.
60 Thiam Ndiaga, “Burkina Faso Marks Official End of French Military Operations on Its Soil,” Reuters, February 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-marks-official-end-french-military-operations-its-soil-2023-02-19/.
61 Abdel-Kader Mazou, Boureima Balima, and Hereward Holland, “French Troops Begin Withdrawal from Niger,” Reuters, October 11, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/french-troops-begin-withdrawal-niger-2023-10-10/; Chinedu Asadu, “France’s Withdrawal from Niger Could Jeopardize Counterterrorism Operations in the Sahel,” AP News, September 27, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/niger-sahel-france-us-coup-counterterrorism-ce19912950c6641e0281d8a10741a8de.
62 AFP, “French Troops to Stay in Chad: Macron Envoy,” The Defense Post, March 8, 2024, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/08/french-troops-stay-chad/.
63 Tiemoko Diallo and Nellie Peyton, “Mali and Niger Revoke Tax Cooperation Treaties with France,” Reuters, December 5, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-revoke-tax-cooperation-treaties-with-france-2023-12-05/.
64 Thomas Naadi, “Burkina Faso’s pro-Russia Junta Expels French Diplomats,” BBC News, April 18, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68846771.
65 Raphael Parens, “The Wagner Group’s Playbook in Africa: Mali,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 18, 2022, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/.
66 Michaela Millender, “IntelBrief: A New Treaty Among African Juntas Amid Deteriorating Security,” The Soufan Center (blog), September 20, 2023, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-september-20/.
67 Cortney Weinbaum et al., “Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa,” RAND, 2022.
68 John Lechner, “To Counter Russia in Africa, America Should Rethink Its Own Role,” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/to-counter-russia-in-africa-america-should-rethink-its-own-role/.
69 Joe Inwood and Jake Tacchi, “Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded,” BBC News, February 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.
70 Thiam Nidiaga, Alessandra Prentice, and Stephen Coates, “Burkina Faso Interim Leader Hails Russia as a Strategic Ally,” Reuters, May 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/burkina-faso-interim-leader-hails-russia-strategic-ally-2023-05-05/.
71 “Russia Reopens Embassy in Burkina Faso,” BBC News, December 28, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67833215.
72 Chris Ewokor and Katherine Armstrong, “Russian Troops Arrive in Niger as Military Agreement Begins,” BBC News, April 12, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68796359.
73 Karr, “Africa File Special Edition.”
74 Toyin Falola and Raphael Chijioke Njoku, United States and Africa Relations, 1400s to the Present (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), 266–67. See chapter 6 for more background on deepening Sino-African engagement.
75 Ilaria Carrozza and Nicholas J. Marsh, “Great Power Competition and China’s Security Assistance to Africa: Arms, Training, and Influence,” Journal of Global Security Studies 7, no. 4 (2022): ogac027.
76 Eric A. Miller, “More Chinese Military Bases in Africa: A Question of When, Not If,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/16/china-military-bases-africa-navy-pla-geopolitics-strategy/; David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” DOD News, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/. Others have reported on Chinese overtures for a base in Namibia. See Craig Singleton, “Mapping the Expansion of China’s Global Military Footprint,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 2, 2023, https://www.fdd.org/plaexpansion/. Half a dozen ports with Chinese investment in West Africa—including two majority Chinese-owned ports in Nigeria and Cameroon—can physically support a naval base. Zongyuan Zoe Liu, “Tracking China’s Control of Overseas Ports,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), November 6, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/tracker/china-overseas-ports.
77 Weinbaum et al., “Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa.”
78 Jonathan Holslag, “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa,” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 367–86; Frédéric Lemaitre, “China Remains Cautious after Coups in Africa,” Le Monde, September 1, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/01/china-remains-cautious-after-coups-in-africa_6119409_4.html; Jevans Nyabiage, “African Coups Make Life Difficult for China’s Belt and Road Projects,” South China Morning Post, October 1, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3235443/coups-threaten-african-stability-china-struggles-make-headway-belt-and-road-interests.
79 Falola and Njoku, United States and Africa Relations, 270.
80 Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Professional Military Education for Africa: Key Influence and Strategy,” United States Institute of Peace, July 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/07/chinese-professional-military-education-africa-key-influence-and-strategy.
81 Authoritarian influence and democracy trends in the region are negatively correlated. Half (27) of Africa’s 54 states saw rising Russian and Chinese influence (per FBIC index, see footnote 67) and declining democracy (per V-Dem) since 2012. By contrast, only five African states saw Russian/Chinese influence fall and democracy improve.
82 “Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies (blog), March 13, 2024, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/.
83 Joshua Eisenman, “China’s Media Propaganda in Africa: A Strategic Assessment,” United States Institute of Peace, March 16, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/chinas-media-propaganda-africa-strategic-assessment; Sarah Cook, “Countering Beijing’s Media Manipulation,” in Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power, ed. William J. Dobson, Tarek Masoud, and Christopher Walker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023), 167–84.
84 Our historical overview of U.S. Africa policy in this section is by necessity selective. For a chronological history, see Herman J. Cohen, U.S. Policy Toward Africa: Eight Decades of Realpolitik (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019).
85 Before 1958, the Africa desk was housed in the Near Eastern Affairs bureau. Falola and Njoku, United States and Africa Relations, 213–14.
86 After independence, the United States urged post-colonial states to maintain close ties with former European colonial powers. Donald Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 180–81.
87 This regional prioritization within Africa is reflected organizationally across many U.S. agencies. At the State Department, for example, North Africa policy (e.g., the Egypt desk) is still run out of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, leaving the Bureau of African Affairs to focus on policy toward the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa.
88 Jimmy Carter visited Nigeria and Liberia in April 1978. Each post–Cold War president from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama visited Africa, but Donald Trump never did. George H.W. Bush visited Somalia in late 1992. Bill Clinton visited nine African countries (Ghana, Uganda, South Africa, Rwanda, Botswana, Senegal, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tanzania) in March–April 1998 and revisited Nigeria and Tanzania in August 2000. George W. Bush visited five African countries in July 2003 (South Africa, Senegal, Botswana, Uganda, and Nigeria) and in February 2008 (Benin, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, and Liberia). Barack Obama visited Africa four times, more than any prior U.S. president. Obama visited Ghana in February 2008, four African countries in June-July 2013 (Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Senegal), South Africa again in September 2013, and Kenya and Ethiopia in July 2015. Most U.S. presidents from Richard Nixon to Obama have visited Egypt at least once (G.H.W. Bush and Trump being the exceptions). Dwight Eisenhower visited Tunisia and Morocco in December 1959. Clinton (and several former U.S. presidents) visited Morocco in 1999 for King Hussein’s funeral. “Travels Abroad of the President,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed October 18, 2023, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president.
89 Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” 181.
90 In 1985, Congress repealed the Clark amendment (Joe Biden gave one of thirty-four dissenting Senate votes), paving the way for the Reagan administration to provide covert aid to UNITA. Jeremy Scahill, “1985: U.S. Support for UNITA Rebels in Angola,” The Intercept, April 27, 2021, https://theintercept.com/2021/04/27/biden-unita-rebels-angola/.
91 Dipo Faloyin, Africa Is Not a Country: Notes on a Bright Continent (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2022), 121–24.
92 If anything, the United States was not above covertly backing coups and assassinations of leftist African leaders, including pan-Africanist gadflies such as Patrice Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah. Stuart A. Reid, The Lumumba Plot: The Secret History of the CIA and a Cold War Assassination (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2023); “Four More Ways the CIA Has Meddled in Africa,” BBC News, May 16, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36303327. The United States often tacitly supported white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. For criticism of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of acceptance of apartheid from a former Kissinger aide and Clinton’s first Secretary of State, see Anthony Lake, The Tar Baby Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
93 Princeton N. Lyman, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002).
94 Marian L. Lawson, “USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives After 15 Years: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2009, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R40600.html.
95 Many aid recipients in Africa also continued to receive aid despite democratic backsliding. Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” 194–95, 199–202.
96 In 1993, 18 U.S. troops were killed in an urban assault in Mogadishu, the infamous “Black Hawk Down” event.
97 Clinton avoided visiting democratic laggards of Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola. Chris Alden, “From Neglect to ‘Virtual Engagement’: The United States and Its New Paradigm for Africa,” African Affairs 99, no. 396 (2000): 365.
98 “African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),” United States Trade Representative, accessed October 18, 2023, http://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa.
99 The Pan Sahel Initiative, a State Department–funded program, sought to combat security and criminal threats across the Sahel. In 2005, such efforts were enhanced by the Pentagon’s Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara and the State Department’s Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative. Nicolas van de Walle, “U.S. Policy Towards Africa: The Bush Legacy and the Obama Administration,” African Affairs 109, no. 434 (2010): 7–8.
100 “United States Africa Command,” October 17, 2023, https://www.africom.mil/.
101 David Greene, Amy Isackson, and Danny Hajek, “George W. Bush Calls Foreign Aid a Moral and Security Imperative,” NPR, April 13, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/04/13/523615019/president-george-w-bush-foreign-aid-in-u-s-national-security-and-moral-interest.
102 van de Walle, “US Policy Towards Africa,” 8. PEPFAR was a major success, saving as many as 25 million lives globally, many in Africa. “The United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,” United States Department of State, accessed April 3, 2024, https://www.state.gov/pepfar/.
103 Falola and Njoku, United States and Africa Relations, chapter 14.
104 Nicolas van de Walle, “Obama and Africa: Lots of Hope, Not Much Change,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 5 (October 2015): 54–61.
105 The Pentagon’s annual Base Structure Report omits the new “lily pads” in Africa, as they typically have a smaller U.S. personnel footprint and, at least in theory, the troops deployed there are on temporary rotation. The exact number of these sites is unclear. David Vine identified twenty-seven U.S. base sites in Africa as of 2020. See David Vine, The United States of War: A Global History of America’s Endless Conflicts, from Columbus to the Islamic State, vol. 48 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021). Nick Turse, “Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of ‘Light’ Footprint,” The Intercept, February 27, 2020, https://theintercept.com/2020/02/27/africa-us-military-bases-africom/; Nick Turse, “Pentagon Misled Congress About U.S. Bases in Africa,” The Intercept, September 8, 2023, https://theintercept.com/2023/09/08/africa-air-base-us-military/; Wesley Morgan, “Behind the Secret U.S. War in Africa,” Politico, July 2, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/02/secret-war-africa-pentagon-664005.
106 Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson, “Less Is More: A New Strategy for U.S. Security Assistance to Africa,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 21, 2023, https://globalaffairs.org/research/report/less-more-new-strategy-us-security-assistance-africa.
107 In this period, no assistant secretary of state was confirmed. Many ambassadorships in Africa were vacant. Acting officers continued existing programs. Nicholas Westcott, “The Trump Administration’s Africa Policy,” African Affairs 118, no. 473 (2019): 737–49; John Campbell, “Trump’s Africa Policy Is Better Than It Looks,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), April 6, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/trumps-africa-policy-better-it-looks. President Trump caused a diplomatic firestorm in Africa when in January 2018 he told congressional leaders in a closed session that the United States should be wary of immigration from “shithole countries” such as Haiti and Africa. Trump’s signature travel ban, which was extended and expanded in January 2020, also alienated many Africans. Trump proposed cuts to the U.S. foreign aid budget for Africa each year through 2020, but Congress mostly maintained prior levels of funding of about $7.5 billion for Africa. Robbie Gramer, “African Ambassadors to Convene in Wake of Trump’s ‘Shithole’ Outburst,” Foreign Policy, January 12, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/12/african-ambassadors-to-meet-in-wake-of-trumps-shithole-outburst-african-union-immigration-oval-office-controversy-state-department-diplomacy/; Zachariah Mampilly and Jason Stearns, “A New Direction for U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa,” Dissent 67, no. 4 (2020): 107–17.
108 “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy,” The White House, December 13, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.
109 Bolton presented the Belt and Road Initiative as a predatory grab for natural resources and influence. Francis Owusu and Padraig Carmody, “Trump’s Legacy in Africa and What to Expect from Biden,” The Conversation, November 25, 2020, http://theconversation.com/trumps-legacy-in-africa-and-what-to-expect-from-biden-150293.
110 Daniel Kliman, “Leverage the New U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to Compete with China,” The Hill, November 16, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/416904-leverage-us-international-development-finance-corporation-compete-with-china/.
111 Owusu and Carmody, “Trump’s Legacy in Africa and What to Expect from Biden.”
112 Marcus Hicks, Kyle Atwell, and Dan Collini, “Great-Power Competition Is Coming to Africa,” Foreign Affairs, March 4, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-03-04/great-power-competition-coming-africa; “Trump Orders Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia,” BBC News, December 5, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55196130.
113 Biden mentions Africa only twice in this article. In the other reference, Biden claims pride in Obama administration efforts to contain the Ebola pandemic in west Africa. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr, “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (2020): 73.
114 Christian von Soest, “The End of Apathy: The New Africa Policy under Joe Biden,” GIGA Focus Africa, no. 2 (2021), https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/the-end-of-apathy-the-new-africa-policy-under-joe-biden.
115 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Biden Approves Plan to Redeploy Several Hundred Ground Forces Into Somalia,” New York Times, May 16, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-military-somalia.html.
116 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Africa Partnership to Promote Food Security and Resilient Food Systems,” The White House, December 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/fact-sheet-u-s-africa-partnership-to-promote-food-security-and-resilient-food-systems/.
117 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Promoting Peace, Security, and Democratic Governance,” The White House, December 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/fact-sheet-u-s-africa-partnership-in-promoting-peace-security-and-democratic-governance/.
118 The White House, “Statement: Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation,” The White House, December 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/statement-special-presidential-representative-for-u-s-africa-leaders-summit-implementation/.
119 Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Nicolas Cook, “U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service, November 7, 2023.
120 The White House, “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” August 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf.
121 “Remarks by President Biden Before the 78th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” The White House, September 19, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/09/19/remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-78th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.
122 Trump’s national security strategy also centered on great power competition but did not emphasize democracy defense as a way to compete. Chin, Skinner, and Yoo, “Understanding National Security Strategies Through Time.”
123 U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken hailed Bazoum’s government as “a model of resilience, a model of democracy, a model of cooperation” when he visited Niamey in March 2023. Dalatou Mamane and Krista Larson, “U.S. Secretary of State Blinken Visits Niger on Africa Tour,” AP News, March 16, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/niger-antony-blinken-us-secretary-state-mohamed-bazoum-jihadis-islamic-extremists-cb35b9b2c543fae94c093e332b556146.
124 Al Jazeera and Reuters, “U.S. Military Resumes Drone, Crewed Aircraft Operations in Post-Coup Niger,” Al Jazeera, September 14, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/14/us-military-resumes-drone-crewed-aircraft-operations-in-post-coup-niger.
125 Austin S. Matthews, “Fixing U.S. Policy Toward Foreign Military Coups,” Lawfare (blog), July 23, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/fixing-u.s.-policy-toward-foreign-military-coups.
126 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Declares the Military Takeover in Niger a Coup,” New York Times, October 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/us/politics/niger-coup-biden-declaration.html; Jim Garamone, “U.S. Shifting Forces Inside Niger, Pentagon Official Says,” DOD News, September 7, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3519412/us-shifting-forces-inside-niger-pentagon-official-says/.
127 Dalibor Roháč, “Dictatorships and Double Standards Redux,” American Purpose (blog), May 10, 2022, https://www.americanpurpose.com/articles/dictatorships-and-double-standards-redux/; Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary Magazine, November 1, 1979, https://www.commentary.org/articles/jeane-kirkpatrick/dictatorships-double-standards/.
128 Matthews, “Fixing U.S. Policy Toward Foreign Military Coups.”
129 “Osama Bin Laden: A Chronology of His Political Life,” PBS FRONTLINE, September 2001, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/etc/cron.html.
130 Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” New York Times, July 29, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html.
131 Ryan Browne and Michael Callahan, “Kenya Terror Attack: Three Americans Killed by Al-Shabaab,” CNN, January 6, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/05/politics/us-service-member-civilian-defense-contractors-killed-kenya/index.html.
132 Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, “Kenyan National Indicted for Conspiring to Hijack Aircraft on Behalf of the Al Qaeda–Affiliated Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab,” December 16, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kenyan-national-indicted-conspiring-hijack-aircraft-behalf-al-qaeda-affiliated-terrorist.
133 News Wires, “U.S. Blames Russia’s Wagner Group for Worsening Security in Mali,” France 24, October 27, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20221027-us-accuses-russia-s-wagner-group-of-worsening-security-situation-in-mali.
134 Wassim Nasr, “How the Wagner Group Is Aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 11 (December 2022): 21–30.
135 In part, the new Sahel Alliance between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger makes navigating the trilemma in the Sahel easier as they have foresworn Western cooperation and cozied up to America’s authoritarian competitors.
136 Steven Bernard and Aanu Adeoye, “The Islamist Insurgents Threatening West Africa,” Financial Times, January 21, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67; “Keeping Jihadists Out of Northern Côte d’Ivoire,” International Crisis Group, August 11, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/b192-keeping-jihadists-out-northern-cote-divoire.
137 Michael M. Phillips, “U.S. Seeks Drone Bases in Coastal West Africa to Stem Islamist Advance,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/u-s-seeks-drone-bases-in-coastal-west-africa-to-stem-islamist-advance-21282861.
138 Liam Karr, “Africa File, February 29, 2024: Russia Eyes Gulf of Guinea, JNIM Massacres Civilians in Burkina Faso,” Critical Threats (blog), February 29, 2024, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-29-2024-russia-eyes-gulf-of-guinea-jnim-massacres-civilians-in-burkina-faso; John Campbell, “Nigeria and Russia Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), August 31, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-and-russia-sign-military-cooperation-agreement.
139 Sani Tukur, “Nigeria Cancels U.S. Military Training as Relations between Both Nations Worsen,” Premium Times, December 1, 2014, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/172178-nigeria-cancels-u-s-military-training-relations-nations-worsen.html.
140 Rachel Yeboah Boakye, Chris Kwaja, and Matthew Edds-Reitman, “To Help Stabilize West Africa, Bolster a Key Partner: Nigeria,” United States Institute of Peace (blog), April 15, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/help-stabilize-west-africa-bolster-key-partner-nigeria.
141 Kester Kenn Klomegah, “Russia and Nigeria: Turning a New Page in Their Relationship?” Modern Diplomacy (blog), March 9, 2024, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/03/09/russia-and-nigeria-turning-a-new-page-in-their-relationship/.
142 David Vergun, “U.S. Uses Holistic Approach in Africa Relations, General Says,” DOD News, March 2, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3316721/us-uses-holistic-approach-in-africa-relations-general-says/.
143 Increasing domestic military capabilities enables recipient countries to manage internal security, deploy in support of external military operations that address regional instability, and contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. For example, Kenya recently offered to lead a peacekeeping mission to Haiti—a mission that previously had no takers. Haleigh Bartos, John Chin, and Tyler Ashner, “Haiti: A Best-Case Scenario,” War on the Rocks, April 30, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/haiti-a-best-case-scenario/.
144 Zainab Usman, “How America Can Foster an African Boom,” Foreign Affairs, August 11, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/africa/how-america-can-foster-african-boom.
145 Whitney Schneidman and Gracelin Baskaran, “Will Biden Visit Africa This Year?” Brookings (blog), September 22, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/will-biden-visit-africa-this-year/.
146 As of May 3, 2024, five ambassadorial posts were still vacant, including those for the African Union, Eswatini, Libya, Mauritania, and Sudan. On May 2, 2024, seven ambassadorial nominees (to Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, and Zimbabwe) were confirmed after long delays. “Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors,” American Foreign Service Association, May 3, 2024, https://afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments.
147 Daphne Psaledakis, “U.S. Names New Special Envoy to Sudan in Push to End War,” Reuters, February 26, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-names-new-special-envoy-sudan-push-end-war-2024-02-26/.
148 “Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel Region of Africa,” United States Department of State, accessed October 19, 2023, https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-african-affairs/office-of-the-special-envoy-for-the-sahel-region-of-africa/; “Michael Hammer: Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa,” United States Department of State (blog), accessed October 19, 2023, https://www.state.gov/biographies/michael-hammer/.
149 Ilhan Omar, “We Need a Marshall Plan for Africa,” The Guardian, October 21, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/oct/21/we-need-a-marshall-plan-for-africa.
150 Adva Saldinger, “Biden’s $6.8T Budget Proposal Would Boost U.S. Foreign Aid. Here’s How,” Devex (blog), March 10, 2023, https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/biden-s-6-8t-budget-proposal-would-boost-us-foreign-aid-here-s-how-105081; Adva Saldinger, “Budget Constraints Limit Foreign Affairs Funding in Biden Proposal,” Devex (blog), March 12, 2024, https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/budget-constraints-limit-foreign-affairs-funding-in-biden-proposal-107228.
151 Several prominent scholarly reviews suggest that U.S. democracy aid may have a modest positive effect on democratization in recipients, even while other types of foreign aid do not. Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 404–39; James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the Developing World, 1988–2001,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 1 (2011): 47–69. Critical for promoting democracy is democratic conditionality. This might be imposed ex-post or ex-ante, as is the case with MCC compacts. Unlike traditional USAID or State Department funding, MCC uses objective scorecards to direct aid to governments with minimum democratic credentials. It can also terminate or suspend compacts after coups, as in Madagascar in 2009, Mali in 2012, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in September 2023. “Where We Work,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed October 21, 2023, https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work.
152 “The President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Request,” U.S. Agency for International Development, March 25, 2024, https://www.usaid.gov/cj; “FACT SHEET: The President’s Budget Confronts Global Challenges and Defends Democracy,” The White House, March 11, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2024/03/11/fact-sheet-the-presidents-budget-confronts-global-challenges-and-defends-democracy/.
153 Bate Felix and Anait Miridzhanian, “What Sanctions Have Been Imposed on Niger since the Coup?” Reuters, August 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-sanctions-have-been-imposed-niger-since-coup-2023-08-08/; AfricaNews and AFP, “African Union Reaffirms Suspension of Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan,” Africanews, February 20, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/20/african-union-reaffirms-suspension-of-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-and-sudan/.
154 Nnamdi Obasi, “What Turmoil in ECOWAS Means for Nigeria and Regional Stability,” International Crisis Group, March 29, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria-sahel/what-turmoil-ecowas-means-nigeria-and-regional-stability.
155 Oisín Tansey, “The Fading of the Anti-Coup Norm,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (2017): 144–56.
156 Howard LaFranchi, “In African ‘Coup Belt,’ Western Values Must Now Compete,” Christian Science Monitor, September 1, 2023, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2023/0901/In-African-coup-belt-Western-values-must-now-compete.
157 Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coups and Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (2014): 799–825; Clayton Thyne et al., “Even Generals Need Friends: How Domestic and International Reactions to Coups Influence Regime Survival,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 7 (2018): 1406–32.
158 Comfort Ero and Murithi Mutiga, “The Crisis of African Democracy: Coups Are a Symptom—Not the Cause—of Political Dysfunction,” Foreign Affairs 103 (2024): 120–34.
159 Lorne Cook, “EU Grapples with Its African Army Training Dilemma as Another Coup Rocks the Continent,” AP International, August 31, 2023, https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/ap-eu-examines-its-training-of-african-armies-as-another-coup-rocks-the-continent/; Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford, “Does U.S. Military Training Embolden Coup Plotters in Africa?” Foreign Policy (blog), August 4, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/04/niger-coup-military-training-africa/.
160 Alexander Noyes, “The Case for a Governance-First U.S. Security Policy in the Sahel,” The RAND Blog (blog), June 8, 2023, https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/06/the-case-for-a-governance-first-us-security-policy.html.
161 Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2012).
162 Brian Finucane, “Still at War: The United States in the Sahel,” Just Security (blog), April 7, 2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/81028/still-at-war-the-united-states-in-the-sahel/.
163 Zainab Usman and Jonathan Glennie, “Sign of the Times: How the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review Affects Relations with Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (blog), February 22, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/02/sign-of-the-times-how-the-united-kingdoms-integrated-review-affects-relations-with-africa?lang=en; James Landale, “UK Foreign Aid Cuts: Thousands Will Die as a Result, Says Report,” BBC News, August 2, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-66378364.
164 Malte Lierl, “Siding with Societies: How Europe Can Reposition Itself in the Sahel,” GIGA Focus Africa, no. 5 (November 2023), https://doi.org/10.57671/gfaf-23052.